Abstract-Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is increasingly used in enterprise information systems, particularly in the form of Web Services. This paper describes a practical trust management system for Web Services that allows information in databases to be used seamlessly and efficiently in trust management policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is increasingly used in enterprise information systems, particularly in the form of Web Services. However, the access control mechanisms built into current Web Services frameworks cannot express the complex security policies of large organizations. As a result, much of the access control for enterprise applications is implemented in application-specific code. Security policies implemented this way are more difficult and therefore more expensive to write, read, verify, and maintain, compared to security policies in simpler, more declarative policy languages. Therefore, we advocate extending the Web Services framework with an application-independent access control mechanism that is capable of expressing enterprise security policies.
A crucial requirement for the design of such a system is support for the decentralized nature of enterprise systems. The security policy and the information it uses come from multiple sources, and the policy must specify which sources are trusted for which decisions and information. This observation motivated work on trust management [1] . Another crucial requirement for the design is convenient and efficient support for policies that use information in relational databases.
No existing trust management framework satisfies these two requirements. Most trust management frameworks are not designed to integrate with Web Services or databases. PeerTrust [2] is a trust management framework for the Semantic Web, but it is not well suited for applications that heavily use databases. iAccess [3] is a semantics-based trust management framework with sophisticated trust negotiation, but use of information in databases is not considered in its design. This paper describes a trust management and trust negotiation framework that satisfies these two requirements. The design builds on the trust management framework for relational databases described in [4] , which extends the original trust management framework for relational databases in [5] . A key feature of the approach is that the policy language is a relatively small extension of SQL. This has multiple benefits:
This work was supported in part by ONR under Grants N00014-07-1-0928 and N00014-09-1-0651, NSF under Grants CCF-0613913, CNS-0627447, and CNS-0831298, and AFOSR under Grant FA0550-09-1-0481. data stored in the database can conveniently and efficiently be used in the policy; the implementation gets the benefits of decades of work on efficient evaluation of SQL queries; and the learning curve is small for people who already know SQL. In contrast, the trust management frameworks mentioned in the previous paragraph, including PeerTrust and iAccess, have policy languages based on Datalog, which is elegant but much less widely used.
II. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE A common architecture for an enterprise Web application includes a Web services engine (server), on which application Web services are deployed. Each Web service offers methods that are invoked by clients using a remote invocation protocol, such as SOAP. Application data is stored in a DBMS. We assume the system has a public-key infrastructure (PKI). We add two pieces to this typical architecture.
A trust management service deployed on the server provides methods for using and managing (administering) the trust management system. Informally, we classify the methods in the trust management service API into two groups. The first group contains methods useful for clients that want to access application Web services; these clients use the trust management service to obtain the necessary permissions. The second group contains methods useful for clients that want to manage (administer) the trust management policy. (Methods in the first group are also useful for these clients). These methods are used to manage the trust management policies for all the Web Services, including the trust management service itself. In this paper, the API is described in an informal notation; in our prototype, the API is defined in WSDL.
An interceptor (handler) in the Web services engine enforces the trust management policy. The engine invokes the interceptor on all incoming requests to invoke methods of the Web service (e.g., SOAP request messages). The interceptor queries the trust management policy and tells the engine to permit or deny the request as appropriate.
Our prototype implementation uses Apache Axis2/Java on Apache Tomcat, and MySQL (thanks to Raveesh Ahuja for implementing the prototype). As a case study, we translated the trust management policy for electronic health records in [6] into our policy language. It is the largest and most realistic formal trust management policy that we have seen. The translation demonstrates that realistic trust management policies can be expressed in our framework.
III. POLICY REPRESENTATION
The trust management policy for a Web service is defined by the contents of SQL views called permission views. Permission views may refer to regular tables and special tables called certificate tables, or "certtables" for short. Permission views and certtables are described in detail below.
A. Permission View
A permission view is, conceptually, a function from the request details to the access control decision (permit or deny). Let S.m denote a method m provided by a Web service S. The "arguments" to the permission view for method S.m are stored in a table named request_S_m, which contains columns invoker (invoker's public key) and invokerDN (invoker's distinguished name), plus columns corresponding to the arguments of method S.m. The interceptor stores information about the current request in this table before evaluating the permission view, converting the XML representation of the arguments to an appropriate SQL representation. If evaluation of the permission view returns a non-empty result set, the request is permitted; otherwise, it is denied. Views are defined using the trust management service's createView method. Its prototype is createView(name, viewDef), where name is the view name, and viewDef is the body of an SQL view definition.
For example, consider a Web service named HRsvc that provides access to electronic health records. The service defines a method agentViewItem(byte[] patient, int itemID) that allows a patient's agent (e.g., spouse) to view an item in the patient's health records. The agent table contains a record with s in the subject column and p in the patient column if s is an agent for p. A sample permission view for this method is as follows, where requestAVI abbreviates request_HRsvc_agentViewItem. createView("permView_HRsvc_agentViewItem", "SELECT * FROM agent, requestAVI WHERE agent.subject = requestAVI.invoker && agent.patient = requestAVI.patient LIMIT 1") This says that an invocation of agentViewItem is permitted if the invoker is in the set of agents of the patient identified by the patient argument of agentViewItem.
B. Certificate Table (Certtable)
A certificate table, abbreviated as certtable, is a special kind of table that stores information from specified trusted sources (issuers) [4] . Only information obtained in signed X.509 attribute certificates can be inserted in certtables. An attribute certificate contains a list of attribute-value pairs, the issuer's public key, and a digital signature. One of the attributes must be subject; the other attributes provide information about the subject.
A certtable is defined by invoking the trust management service's method createCerttable(name, colDefs, constraint, issuers, fetchFrom, ) . issuers may be a public key, identifying a specific issuer, or a query of the form select column from ctv, where ctv is the name of a certtable, table, or view. The second form means that the users whose public keys are returned by the query are trusted issuers for this certtable. The fetchFrom and releaseTo arguments are described in Section VI. When the allowed issuers are specified using a certtable, table, or view ctv, if records for an issuer are removed from ctv, certificates issued by that issuer are automatically removed from the certtable.
Every certtable contains the following columns, even if they are not explicitly declared: subject, subjectDN, issuer, expiration, and certificate. The certificate column contains the X.509 certificate from which the information in the record was obtained.
For example, if doctors are trusted issuers for information about agents, the agent certtable could be defined by (the certType attribute makes the certificate's purpose explicit) createCerttable( name="agent", colDefs="certType varchar(30), patient varchar(1000)", constraint="certType='agent'", issuers="select subject from doctor", fetchFrom="issuer", releaseTo="GP for same patient" ) IV. TRUST MANAGEMENT SERVICE API: METHODS FOR POLICY ADMINISTRATORS Figure 1 summarizes methods in the trust management service API that are useful (in addition to the methods in Section V) for managing the trust management policy.
The grant method in Figure 1 is used to grant permissions for invoking methods of the trust management service. Note that the grant method is not used to grant permissions for invoking methods of application Web services; that is accomplished by defining appropriate permission views and The grant table has the following columns: operation (operation for which permission is granted), resource (resource on which the operation is permitted), grantees (users to whom permission is granted), and grantName (unique identifier for this record). We refer to an operation and resource together as a "permission" or "privilege". The use of operation names, instead of method names, in permissions, is a convenient abstraction. grantees is the name of a certtable, table, or view whose subject column contains the identities (public keys) of the grantees. Figure 2 shows the allowed values of operation and the corresponding allowed values of resource. In resources, the special value "*", called wildcard, can be used to represent all (other) allowed values. The resource for the grant operation is a pair containing an operation and a resource; this is a recursive definition.
createCerttable is described in Section III-B. The permission view for createCerttable checks that (i.e., returns a non-empty result set if) the invoker has permission for create on certtable. createCerttable updates the grant table to give the invoker appropriate permissions on the new certtable. All certtables are owned by a database account associated with the trust management service, not by the invoker of createCerttable (who might not even have a database account); this is also true for views created using createView.
createView is described in Section III-A. The permission view for createView checks that the invoker has permission for create on view. createView updates the grant table to give the invoker select and grant permissions on the new view.
grant inserts a record in the grant table. The arguments of this method correspond directly to the columns of the grant table. The permission view for grant checks that the invoker has permission for grant on the pair containing the specified operation and resource. grant updates the grant table to give the invoker revoke permission on the new grant.
revoke removes the record with the specified name in the grantName column from the grant view for revoke checks that the invoker has permission for revoke on the named grant.
setPermView sets the named view to be the permission view for the specified method of the specified application Web service, by updating a table maintained by the trust management service. The permission view for setPermView checks that the invoker has permission for setPermView on the pair containing the specified service and method.
V. TRUST MANAGEMENT SERVICE API: METHODS FOR
APPLICATION CLIENTS Figure 3 lists methods in the trust management API that are useful for application clients (and policy administrators).
insertAttribCert inserts a record in the specified certtable. The new record contains the attribute values from the specified X.509 attribute certificate cert; the certificate itself is stored in the certificate column. The permission view for insertAttribCert checks that the invoker has insert permission on the specified certtable. The insertion succeeds if (1) cert has a valid signature, (2) cert contains attributes corresponding to all of the columns in the certtable (the certificate may contain other attributes as well), (3) cert's issuer is allowed by the certtable's issuer specification, and (4) the attribute values in cert satisfy the certtable's constraint. If the certtable argument is the empty string, the certificate is inserted in all certtables on which the invoker has insert permission and for which the above conditions are satisfied.
insertPKcert is similar to insertAttribCert, except that the argument is an X.509 public-key certificate, which is treated as an attribute certificate containing only subject (subject's public key), subjectDN (subject's distinguished name), issuer, and expiration attributes.
deleteCert deletes records satisfying the specified constraint from the specified certtable. The constraint is a Boolean expression of the form allowed in SQL delete statements. The permission view checks that the invoker has permission for delete on the specified certtable.
getCert(col, val, colDefs, constraint) returns all certificates, stored in any certtable, that satisfy the criteria indicated by the method arguments. Specifically, it returns certificates that (1) have an attribute named col with value val, (2) contain attributes corresponding to all of the columns in colDefs, (3) satisfy the constraint on the attribute values, and (4) are releasable to the invoker, as defined in Section VI.
requestPerm attempts to provide the invoker with permission to invoke the specified method of the specified service, by fetching relevant attribute certificates, using the algorithm in Section VI. The permission view checks that the invoker has requestPerm.
VI. CERTIFICATE FETCHING AND TRUST NEGOTIATION
Users can obtain desired permissions by explicitly inserting certificates in certtables. However, relying on users to do this is usually impractical. Our trust management service supports automated fetching of certificates from servers indicated in the policy. This is sometimes called credential discovery [7] .
The fetchFrom argument of createCerttable (see Figure 1 ) specifies a user from whom the trust manager should request certificates when a desired certificate is not already present in the certtable. The legal values are: "" (do not fetch certificates for this certtable); "issuer" (request certificates from the users specified by the issuers argument for this certtable); and subject (request certificates from the subject of the desired certificate). The trust management service fetches certificates from a user by invoking the getCert method on the specified user's home server. In our prototype, a user's home server is named in the user's public-key certificate; alternatively, a directory service could be used.
The releaseTo argument of createCerttable defines the release policy for the certtable. It specifies the set of users to whom certificates in the certtable may be released via (i.e., returned from) getCert. The legal values of releaseTo, and the sets of users they denote, are: "" (no one), public (everyone), a public key (that user), ctv (the name of a certtable or view, denoting the subjects of records therein), and ctv for same col (the subjects of records r in ctv such that column col of r has the same value as attribute r in the certificate being considered for release).
Examples of fetchFrom and releaseto appear in the definition of the agent certtable in Section III-B. releaseTo="GP for same patient" means that agent certificates for a patient may be released to the patient's general practitioner (GP). This assumes the certtable GP contains a record with subject = c and patient = p if clinician c is patient p's general practitioner.
The trust management service uses certificate fetching-in the form of calls to getCert-in multiple places. (1) In the algorithms for insertAttribCert and insertPKcert, if the issuers of the target certtable t are specified by a certtable or view ctv, and there is no record in ctv for the issuer i of the certificate being inserted, certificate fetching is used to try to obtain certificates about i that establish that i is a trusted issuer for t. This is done recursively: if ctv is a certtable, certificates are fetched for its issuers certtable (if necessary), and so on. (2) In the algorithm for getCert itself, if a candidate certificate cannot be released because there is no suitable record for the invoker in a certtable t used in the relevant releaseTo policy, the algorithm calls getCert to try to obtain such a certificate. This can lead to a distributed "chain reaction" of calls to getCert. Such interactions are usually called trust negotiation. (3) Certificate fetching is used in the algorithm for requestPerm, as described next. requestPerm(service, method) works as follows. If the specified service is the trust management service TMsvc, let T be the set of certtables that appear in the grantees column of any record in the grant table with the specified method in the operation column; otherwise, let T be the set of certtables t such that t or a view that depends on t appears in the permission view for the specified method of the specified service.
For each certtable t in T , the trust management service tries to obtain certificates whose subject is the invoker and that can be inserted in certtable t. It does this by invoking getCert(subject, u, colDefs(t), constraint(t)) on the home servers of users indicated by fetchFrom(t), where colDefs(t), constraint(t), and fetchFrom(t) return the colDefs, constraint, and fetchFrom arguments, respectively, from t's definition. Furthermore, if it receives a certificate c that cannot be inserted in the target certtable t because there is no record for c's issuer i in the certtable or view (if any) in issuers(t), it uses certificate fetching as described above for insertAttribCert to try to establish that i is an issuer for t.
VII. NESTED SERVICE CALLS
SOAs often lead to nested service calls: a server may invoke other services while processing a request, those other services may utilize yet other services, etc. To support secure processing of nested service calls, our system keeps track of the calling context of each request-a sequence of public keys identifying the services in the chain of nested calls that led to this request. We extend request tables with a context column, and we extend the interceptor for incoming calls to extract the calling context from the SOAP header and store it in the context column of the request table. The calling context can be used freely in permission views.
